THE CHINA READER

President Obama’s recent trip to China was harshly criticized by the Western media as having been a “failure”. Among the criticisms: he was too deferential; he didn’t speak out enough on human rights; he failed to press Beijing firmly on revaluing its currency; he achieved no concrete results on Iran or North Korea….and the list goes on.

Quite the opposite, I would argue the trip was a success on many levels. The major goal of the trip was to make the case for multilateral cooperation regarding the pressing challenges of the global economy, climate change, nuclear proliferation, Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan-Pakistan. America cannot solve these problems alone and it cannot seek China’s help while ignoring their interests or giving disproportionate emphasis to human rights. Obama understands this and made significant progress in getting China on board with many of these U.S.- led efforts.

It is not useful to assess Obama’s trip according to goals he didn’t set for himself. Contrary to popular opinion (and the press), Obama did not expect China to agree to any deliverables upon completion of his visit there, like revaluing its currency, making concessions on Tibet or human rights, or agreeing to significant deviations in regards to its North Korea or Iran policies. Significant differences remain between the two countries on these issues and it is unrealistic to expect large shifts in Chinese policy with one presidential visit. However, recent reports about China’s decision to back a strongly worded rebuke of Iran’s nuclear program and pledge to significantly curtail emissions point to the fact that Obama may have gotten small but substantive pledges from the Chinese.  Unfortunately, as is often the case when the media follows presidential trips abroad, perceptions trump reality, and in the 24-hour news cycle, initial perceptions of events, however right or wrong, get plastered on the front pages of newspapers nationwide. Perceptions are often wrong, and I would argue that any outcome from the trip could take weeks, months, even years to bear fruit.

The Atlantic’s James Fallows has been leading the charge against the negatives perceptions of Obama’s trip. I found two posts on the reaction from an expat and an Obama administration official to Obama’s Shanghai Town Hall Meeting particularly interesting. Two sections I’d like to highlight: one from a foreigner living and working in China for over two decades:

“…But the comment from President Obama that I think will have the most impact inside the firewall was not the one about US principles that you quoted in your followups. It was this one:

‘Now, I should tell you, I should be honest, as President of the United States, there are times where I wish information didn’t flow so freely because then I wouldn’t have to listen to people criticizing me all the time. I think people naturally are — when they’re in positions of power sometimes thinks, oh, how could that person say that about me, or that’s irresponsible, or — but the truth is that because in the United States information is free, and I have a lot of critics in the United States who can say all kinds of things about me, I actually think that that makes our democracy stronger and it makes me a better leader because it forces me to hear opinions that I don’t want to hear. It forces me to examine what I’m doing on a day-to-day basis to see, am I really doing the very best that I could be doing for the people of the United States.’

“Wow! As a resident of China for two decades and a Mandarin-speaking China-watcher for three decades, I can say without any doubt that those words will resonate far more deeply — and potentially more “subversively” or “destabilizingly” — than any overt thumb-in-the-eye hectoring that any foreigner or foreign leader might muster, in public or private. Those words are ***precisely*** the kind that Zhongnanhai [Chinese term equivalent to "the Kremlin"] fears the most, and rightly so.”

And this one from an Obama administration official in charge of coordinating the trip about what the Administration hoped for from the trip:

“In thinking about the trip, the things we were trying to accomplish were all basically long term things. We were not looking for ‘deliverables’ or one-day stories. You’ve now got eight or nine countries among the G20 that are Asia-Pacific countries. The historic shift of power and influence from West to East is reflected in that number.

“Obama is very focused on global issues, things like climate change, financial imbalances, non proliferation, energy issues. We saw all the countries on this trip as players on those global issues. Of course China is important in particular, but also Korea and Japan and the ASEAN countries. So we saw this as a way of developing relationships that would be helpful to us as we tackled these issues coming down the road.

“We’ve got Copenhagen [climate talk] coming up in mid-December. We have Iran heading increasingly likely toward Plan B rather than Plan A, pressure rather than inducements. North Korea. And the Copenhagen session is very far from a done deal. The countries we dealt with are all key players here. And on the economic side, you’ve got the whole issue of rebalancing the global agenda. None of those is something where you come out of a meeting and say Eureka. They’re all part of a long process and a long game.

“The other thing we had in mind, which has to do with the whole “rising China” phenomenon: we wanted to solidify the relationship with China. To show them that we’re not going to have a fluctuating policy. That we know what we’re doing, and understand that we are dealing from a position of strength. And at the same time, to all our traditional allies [Japan, Korea, etc], we wanted to reinforce their sense of comfort that our relationship with China won’t be at their expense.”

About the Town Hall meeting in Shanghai: Why was it “censored” rather than streamed to anyone who wanted to see it in China?

“We negotiated endlessly against a very difficult Chinese government on the issue. Their intransigence tells me several things. It was the day before the meeting with Hu Jintao, and there were uneasy about what might be said in a live format. ["Surprise" = "unacceptable risk" in many official Chinese dealings.] This was also a townhall format of a type they had never had before. [What about Bill Clinton's? That was a roundtable plus a speech, not a town hall.] We wanted to have 1000 or 1500 people. They said No. Security problems, and so on. So, we got to 500. We insisted on live streaming. Endless fights on that. Then live TV. Endless fights. And questions from the internet. Huge fights over who would pose them and who would screen. There wasn’t a single aspect of the meeting that wasn’t hard fought.

“It was tortured enough that we thought about pulling the plug. At the end of the day we decided to go through. The point is that on the Chinese side, this showed more than the usual anxiety. I think there was a genuine anxiety about the possible… force of Barack Obama. I would say a word short of “subversive” or “destabilizing.” But something profoundly disturbing to their system of government and control. The anxiety was a tribute to the kind of inspirational force he has.

“What they actually did, was to put the live streaming part on Xinhua.net. For the opening portion, we studied very carefully Ronald Reagan’s speech at Fudan in 1984. It began almost identically: Here is who we are, and these are our values. But Reagan’s ended with a poem from Zhou Enlai. Can you Imagine what would have happened if Barack Obama had ended up with a poem by Zhou Enlai?

“We know there were tens of millions of hits on Xinhua.net. And more than two or three tens of millions. Some people complained that this was carried ‘only’ on Shanghai TV, but that reaches reaches 100 million households. Of the top 10 Chinese web sites, nine carried news and commentary. Thousands of user generated messages and blog posts. Tens of millions people in the first instance saw it, and by the time it’s over the number is going to be staggering. Whenever we had a discussion about, Should we pull the plug, we thought, if there is an opportunity to talk to tens of millions of people, that is an opportunity we should take. People can draw their conclusions about China and America from the event.”

And this from Obama’s National Security Advisor for Asia and Chief China advisor, Jeffrey Bader, about Obama’s comments to Hu Jintao on human rights, which you can find in it entirety here:

“I just want to say a word about human rights. I’ve been involved in the China relationship for over 30 years, and I’ve been on previous presidential visits, visits by secretaries of state to China. This was as direct a discussion on human rights as I’ve seen by any high-level visitor with the Chinese. And this was multifaceted. You all saw the Shanghai event yesterday in which the President spoke at some length in his introductory remarks about American values, about rule of law, freedom of expression, access to information, the rights of minorities — called them universal rights; and then in the question-and-answer session talked again at some length about the importance of an uncensored Internet and how people benefit, countries benefit, and leaders benefit from the openness of the Internet. I have never heard that kind of a discussion publicly in China before…

…they discussed Tibet. The President — you saw in the joint press conference, the President referred — the joint press conference, the President referred explicitly to the importance of protection of freedom of religion and the rights of ethnic minorities, and then immediately discussed the importance of a resumption of a dialogue between the Dalai Lama and representatives — the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese government. That was a deliberate and a clear statement of the priority the President places on this, and it was discussed privately, as well — the President making clear his respect for the Dalai Lama as a cultural and religious leader, and his intention to meet with the Dalai Lama at an appropriate time.”

December 9th, 2009 | Category: Dalai Lama, Democracy, Hu Jintao, Human Rights, Internet Freedom, Media Reform, Politics, US-China Relations | Leave a comment

The George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations each produced Asia strategy reports outlining their visions and overall strategy for Asia, coalescing around a catch phrase that would guide U.S. policy. In 2005, former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick announced his idea that China become a “responsible stakeholder”, calling for Beijing to become increasingly integrated in international institutions so that they might see it as in their interest to act in concert with the international community (a euphemism for the West) on a range of issues. The Clinton administration’s concept of building a ‘‘cooperative strategic partnership’’ was an effort to redefine relations in positive terms after years of mistrust and friction. Thus in preparation for president Obama’s first trip to Asia and China, experts on both sides have been waiting to see if the Obama administration will continue with the Bush administration’s “responsible stakeholder” axiom or come up with a new phrase to describe the bilateral relationship.

They might have gotten their answer. Recently, US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, Zoellick’s successor, formulated his own China paradigm, “strategic reassurance”, in a September 24 speech at the Center for a New American Security.

“Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s ‘arrival’… as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain must be a priority in the U.S.-China relationship. And strategic reassurance must find ways to highlight and reinforce the areas of common interest, while addressing the sources of mistrust directly, whether they be political, military or economic.”

Since that day, it has been unclear whether the term “strategic reassurance” represents a new formalized framing of relations on the part of the Obama Administration or simply Steinberg’s own construction.  Many experts had previously pointed to the April 1 Obama-Hu agreement to work together to build a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship’’ as being the new, mutually agreed upon catch phrase.

Either way, this appears a wise choice and a welcome departure from the previous two slogans. The “responsible stakeholder” idea, while now understood and generally supported by both sides, was initially contentious since many Chinese saw it as too judgmental - there was disagreement over who got to decide what behavior was ‘responsible’ and what ’stake’ China actually had in the international system.  Similarly, the earlier pledge by the Clinton administration of a “cooperative strategic partnership’’ made some US allies nervous out of concern that this proposed arrangement would somehow supersede Washington’s other alliance relationships. The phrase came to be symbolic of the Clinton Administration’s “naivete” in dealing with Beijing, much as conservative critics in the mid-70s had associated “detente” with the alleged naivete of US policy toward Moscow.  This new phase seems to split the difference and keeps both sides on equal footing.

The good news is that both sides seem committed to trust-building and enhanced cooperation. The decision to establish a US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue with Secretary of State Clinton and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo chairing the ‘Strategic Track’ and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan chairing the ‘Economic Track’ is a positive development in helping the two sides flesh out important bilateral issues.  What a difference the word ‘and’ makes. During the Bush administration there was a Strategic Economic Dialogue but the focus was almost exclusively on ‘economic’. Now the dialogue can truly become strategic and sensitive security issues have and will be put on the table and seriously discussed.

A realistic and pragmatic policy should recognize and accept China’s growing political and cultural influence in the Asia-Pacific, focus American strategy away from visions of military conflict and toward the arenas of economic, political and cultural cooperation and competition, and prioritize areas of policy concern, recognizing that human rights, military modernization, energy competition and environmental issues all require ‘‘different tools and different levels of effort and emphasis’’. The opportunity – and the need – for cooperation in these non-traditional security areas has never been greater.  In a speech soon after becoming Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made it clear that the Obama administration rejects the view promulgated by some pundits and former Bush administration officials that a rising China is automatically or inherently an adversary. ‘‘To the contrary,’’ Secretary Clinton has argued, ‘‘the US and China can benefit from and contribute to each others success.’’

In short, the engagement policy followed by every US president since Richard Nixon is likely to continue under the Obama administration. Whether or not Steinberg’s speech represents a comprehensive articulation of the Obama administration’s China policy, however, remains to be seen.

November 13th, 2009 | Category: Hu Jintao, Politics, US-China Relations | Leave a comment

China’s military has made dramatic progress in space over the past decade and the goals of its program remain unclear, a top US general said on Tuesday.

Citing Beijing’s advances in space, General Kevin Chilton, head of US Strategic Command, said it was crucial to cultivate US-China military relations to better understand China’s intentions.

“With regard to China’s capabilities, I think anyone who’s familiar with this business — and particularly our history in this business over the years — would have to be absolutely amazed at the advancement that China has made in such a short period of time, whether that be in their unmanned program or the manned program,” Chilton said. “They have rapidly advanced over the last ten years.”

Chilton’s comments came after a top Chinese air force commander, Xu Qiliang, called the militarization of space a “historical inevitability” and said that the country’s military was developing offensive and defensive operations in space.

The Chinese commander’s remarks, reported by state media on Monday, marked an apparent shift in Beijing’s opposition to weaponizing outer space.

Chilton acknowledged that space had become an arena for military rivalry, with an increasing number of countries pursuing space-based weaponry — including Iran and North Korea.

Chilton added that both sides have come to understand that space is a contested domain. “It used to be looked at like a sanctuary,” he said, “and clearly that’s not the case today.”

Asked about the Chinese commander’s remarks, Chilton said that Beijing’s space program “is an area that we’ll want to explore, and understand exactly what China’s intentions are here and why they might want to go in that direction, and what grounds might accommodate a different direction.”

Chilton said a visit last week to U.S. Strategic Command headquarters by General Xu Caihou, China’s second-ranking military officer, marked a promising step in efforts to promote more dialogue with Beijing.

“I think maybe through dialogue we can better understand what their broader objectives are. I think that’s one of the most encouraging things about the visit we had last week,” he said.

Calling it “an initial introductory visit,” Chilton said the military was looking for opportunities to begin follow-up dialogue with the Chinese military and that Strategic Command was ready to contribute its expertise in discussions on space and nuclear deterrence.

US defense analysts have warned that the US military will soon lose its dominance in space as China and other emerging powers obtain sophisticated weaponry and missiles. China has long stated that it supported the peaceful uses of outer space and opposed the introduction of weapons there. Beijing has also sought to establish an international treaty to control the deployment of weapons in space.

However, in January 2007, China rattled foreign military leaders when it shot down one of its own weather satellites in a test seen by the U.S. and others as a provocative display of space missile technology.

China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a “shock and awe strike” on satellites “will shake the structure of the opponent’s operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.” Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry China is increasing investments in anti-satellite weaponry for the purpose of disrupting U.S. satellite capabilities.

November 4th, 2009 | Category: China's Military, US-China Relations | Leave a comment

China’s 60th Anniversary celebration a few weeks back was a monumental spectacle by any standard. Hundreds of thousands of troops, schoolchildren and civilians meticulously rehearsed months in advance. Jets, tanks and missile-toting trucks filed through in a show of military muscle, displaying China’s transformation from a war-battered regional player into global economic superpower. Thousands watched from the stands waving little red Chinese flags while countless other millions watched from their TV sets. Chinese citizens worldwide were flushed with an overwhelming sense of national pride and honor.

Then I talked to my dad, who I think encapsulated the prevailing sentiment for non-Chinese Westerners watching the event outside China, when he said, “It reminds me of North Korea and Cold War-era Soviet Union.” Granted, my dad is prone to hyperbole. And, if he had watched China’s 50th Anniversary celebration, for example, this recent display should not have come as a surprise. But his general reaction to China’s audacious display of military might brings up an important point: might the PRC’s once-a-decade military extravaganza work at cross purposes with its attempt to promote a benign global image? In other words, is this show of might and power - largely orchestrated to appeal to a Chinese domestic audience - actually perpetuating outside suspicions that other countries have something to fear in China’s rise? It’s a scenario undoubtedly considered by China’s leaders. But for them, legitimizing CCP rule and grandeur will always trump what those “outsiders” think. I wonder though, if they are fully aware of its long-term negative effect on China’s global image. This post from the Lowy Institute sums it up best.

October 13th, 2009 | Category: China's Military, Politics | Leave a comment

From today’s NY Times:

“President Obama on Saturday selected one of the nation’s leading Republican governors to serve as the ambassador to China, nominating Gov. Jon Huntsman Jr. of Utah for a diplomatic post that Mr. Obama called “as important as any in the world.” The decision renewed Mr. Obama’s sometimes rocky efforts to reach across the aisle in an era of political polarization while signaling that he would continue the American policy of economic and strategic engagement with China advanced by presidents of both parties in recent times.”

The pick was not surprising considering his China background and Mandarin skills, but somewhat noteworthy, as Huntsman Jr. is considered a right-of-center Republican from Utah.  Many had been critical of Obama’s long delay in choosing such an important post, considering how much is at stake in U.S.-China relations.  It’s good to see the pick has finally been made.

May 16th, 2009 | Category: Politics, US-China Relations | Leave a comment

Just when it appeared military relations between the United States and China were beginning to enter a more conciliatory phase, you have incidents like the USNS Impeccable flare-up two weeks ago to remind us how easily tensions can arise.

It was only last month in Beijing that the United States and China conducted high level military talks that were praised by the Pentagon as the “most productive in the 18 years of military negotiations with Beijing.” Known as the “Defense Policy Coordination Talks”, the two-day meeting seemed to presage improved military-to-military relations between American and Chinese officials, an area which has historically been fraught with intermittent conflict and tension.

The latest confrontation started when Chinese vessels surrounded and harassed the USNS Impeccable about 75 miles off Hainan island, south of the Chinese mainland, during a routine surveillance mission. The Chinese boats were maritime fishing vessels with Chinese flags, but were not affiliated with the Chinese military. At least one vessel came within 25 feet of the American vessel, and at one point Chinese sailors used long hooks to try to snag cables (see picture above) the Navy boat was using to tow sonar equipment designed for antisubmarine warfare. In response, the Impeccable, which is an unarmed civilian vessel, sprayed water out of fire hoses at one of the vessels as a warning, but its crew members stripped to their underwear as their ship “continued closing to within 25 feet,” the Pentagon said. Two of the Chinese vessels stopped directly in the path of the U.S. ship, forcing it to conduct an emergency stop. (For video of the incident, click here).

The U.S. immediately lodged a formal complaint with Beijing, saying that under international law, the U.S. military can conduct activities “in waters beyond the territorial sea of another state without prior notification or consent,” including in an exclusive economic zone of another country, said Maj. Stewart Upton, a Pentagon spokesman. The Impeccable and another ocean surveillance ship have been targeted five times in the past week, the Pentagon said, for “increasingly aggressive conduct” by Chinese ships and aircraft. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs reiterated the U.S. Navy will “continue to operate in those international waters, and we expect the Chinese to observe international law around there.”

The Chinese foreign ministry issued a sharp response, saying U.S. claims were “gravely in contravention of the facts and confuse black and white, and they are totally unacceptable to China and violated international maritime laws and customs around China’s Special Economic Zone.”

At issue is what exactly constitutes “international waters” and whether China’s aggressive behavior was appropriate. In both cases I would argue the answer to those questions is a resounding “no”.

Under the United Nations Charter Article 51, it states, “any dispute over activities in the 200-mile economic zone from China’s coast in no way authorizes the use of force.” If the country in authority of the economic zone feels its rights have been infringed upon, it states, “a formal complaint is to be lodged through relevant international administrative bodies and the United Nations.”  Furthermore, it explicitly states that “all countries enjoy high-seas freedoms in such zones, including the right to engage in military activities without prior notification to, or consent of, the coastal state.”

Of course we have seen this kind of harassing behavior before from China, most notably in 2001 when Chinese fighter planes surrounded and antagonized a US surveillance plane, called the EP-3, clipping its wing and forcing it to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island where the plane and crew were held for eleven days. The accident resurrected arguments concerning state interpretation of article 58 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), and more specifically, whether the distinct legal regime created by the establishment of an EEZ has imposed limitations on ‘pre-existing rights’ on the high seas. The U.S. and many other countries have been using the EEZ area in the South China Sea to conduct both military and commercial missions, and China has never formally lodged a complaint. The U.S. maintained, as in the latest Impeccable incident, that the location of the incident occurred in international waters, and that the U.S. had the right of free transit passage. During the EP-3 incident, the Chinese again regarded U.S. activity as “unlawful” and claimed the area as part of their airspace over their exclusive economic zone based on the UNCLS, which is considered the codification of Customary International Law.

Hainan Island is an area of strategic concern for the U.S.. China has invested heavily in a new fleet of diesel-powered attack submarines and maintains a submarine base there.  Beijing’s obfuscation about the reasons behind its recent spike in military spending and submarine purchases have added to U.S. suspicions of potential Chinese military aggrandizement in the region.

However, whether or not China feels the U.S. was conducting “spying activity” is tangential. In both cases, Beijing has acted in an aggressive manner, almost as a “show of strength” to admonish Washington to curtail its activities, which strikes me as more befitting to the erratic, provocative behavior we’ve come to expect from Pyongyang than a great power. If China genuinely feels threatened, there are proper channels to go through that could mitigate and address Chinese grievances. It is actions like these that in my opinion make China look like a weak, not strong power. But China has shown it prefers the more provocative approach, which seems to leave the door open for more flare-ups in the future.

March 22nd, 2009 | Category: China's Military, US-China Relations | Leave a comment

In the face of ominous signs that China’s economy is slowing dramatically due to the world economic downturn, Premier Wen Jiabao, citing “unprecedented difficulties and challenges,” announced an ambitious plan to stimulate domestic spending through infrastructure projects and investment during the recently completed 11th National Peoples Congress.  (For the full text of Premier Wen’s Work Report, click here). In frank terms, Mr. Wen laid out plans to invest heavily in infrastructure, health care and job retraining programs to reinvigorate China’s suddenly lethargic economy hit hard by a steep decline in global import demand.  It was not made explicit whether the plan would be a part of the $585 Billion stimulus package passed last November. Wen also hinted at plans to adjust China’s long-term economic strategy by encouraging citizens to spend and consume more at home, a model advanced by many Western economies.

Recent figures do not bode well for China’s current economic forecast.  Unemployment has risen dramatically over the last few months, with an estimated 20 million of China’s 130 million migrant workers unable to find work. Textile factories are closing by the thousands leaving large swaths of China’s textile workers unemployed. The World Bank on Wednesday lowered its economic growth forecast for China this year to 6.5 percent, down from 7.5 percent at the end of last November, after huge falls in exports and shrinking private sector investment.

As a large country with an unusually high degree of openness to the world economy, China depends on other countries, notably the United States, for its domestic prosperity and stability.  Thus China is highly vulnerable to shocks from the international economy.  The latest figures show foreign trade accounts for 75% of China’s GDP - an astounding figure when put in perspective. Western economists have been urging China to move towards a more domestic-driven growth model to stave off potential economic crisis in the event of a global economic downturn. It seems as though the recent financial crisis is forcing China to take seriously this adjustment to their economic model to guard against its vulnerability to global import demand.

Beijing considers rapid economic growth a political imperative because it is the only way to prevent massive unemployment and labor unrest.  For more than two decades, the government has based its economic policies on a predetermined algorithm derived from its priority on stability.  The economy must grow at an annual rate of 7 percent or more in order to create a certain number of jobs - estimated to be around 10 million per year - to keep unemployment rates at levels that will prevent widespread labor unrest.  This 7 percent growth target rate has become the unambiguous fixture among upper level Party members when determining domestic policies.

China does not have to be reminded of its vulnerabilities at the hands of an unruly populace.  Chinese history textbooks teach that dynasties fall when they are overwhelmed by the twin threats of internal unrest and foreign aggression (内乱外患). The Qing dynasty collapsed because of a weakened administration beset by corruption and encroachment on Chinese sovereignty by Western powers.  The Taiping and Boxer rebellions were grassroots campaigns stoked by anti-foreign nationalistic peasants angry over the failings of a weak Chinese state.  The Chinese civil war was won by the ability of the Communists to rein in and inspire the power of the peasants.

The worst nightmare of China’s leaders is a national protest movement of discontented groups - unemployed workers, hard-pressed farmers, and students - united against the regime by the shared fervor of nationalism.  The horror of 1989 is no doubt everpresent in the minds of Communist officials, and its safe to say the current Hu and Wen administration is fearful that the PRC could meet the same fate.  Thus staying ahead of the wave of popular nationalism and discontent that is constantly under the surface is the name of the game for China’s leaders.

Consequently, since 1989, the term “social stability” became a fixture of CCP rhetoric. Stripped down to essence however, this is merely a euphemism to convince the Chinese public that Communist Party rule is essential for maintaining order and prosperity, and without it, a country as large as China could descend into civil war and chaos.  In their speeches, the leaders make no secret of their anxieties and social unrest, frequently using the catchphrase ”维护社会安全“ or “maintaining social order” as the overarching principle of Chinese development.

To be sure, it is easy to see why CCP leaders are obsessed with preserving social order.  There are signs all around them of burgeoning social unrest that Beijing is acutely aware of.  Official statistics indicate that there were 58,000 “incidences of social unrest” in 2003, 74,000 in 2004, and 87,000 in 2005.  Scanning the horizon from Zhongnanhai, the government epicenter in Beijing, CCP leaders see nothing but the spector of inchoate social unrest threatening the legitimacy Communist Party rule.

In his address, Premier Wen said that the central government would significantly increase spending on schools, hospitals and clinics, low-income housing, environmental programs and other projects aimed at improving people’s lives, which he sees as the source of China’s long-term economic woes. He also reaffirmed plans to raise subsidies to farmers, old-age pensions and income grants to China’s poorest citizens, and said spending on “social safety net” programs would increase 17.6 percent, or about $6.4 billion.

Persuading conservative Chinese consumers to spend and abandon longstanding savings habits may be a difficult task. China’s consumers are notorious savers, often putting away 30% of their paychecks for unexpected expenditures like a sickness in the family or for more long-term costs like college tuition or retirement. As long as China’s social safety net remains frail, the incentive to save is still very strong among China’s consumers.

March 21st, 2009 | Category: Economic Policy, Economy, Labor, Wen Jiabao | Leave a comment

Due to a heavy workload this semester, I’ve been M.I.A. as of late.  Apologies.

I will be get back in the swing of things after midterms end this week.  In the meantime, Andrew Jacobs has an interesting article in today’s NY Times about China’s underground detention centers. More to come about China’s National People’s Congress currently underway as well.

March 8th, 2009 | Category: Human Rights, Politics | Leave a comment

In a stunning site, the hotel adjacent to the newly-built CCTV tower in Beijing was completely destroyed after a raging fire burned unabated the night before. The fire, reportedly caused by fireworks gone astray during a ceremonial pyrotechnics display celebrating the final day of the lunar year, destroyed one of Beijing’s most eye-catching and modern architectural accomplishments - The Mandarin Oriental Hotel - located adjacent to CCTV’s futuristic-looking headquarters, both built by Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas. Chinese Central Television issued an apology, saying in a statement posted on its web site that the network apologized for the incident and was deeply sorry for the “severe damage the fire caused to the country’s property.”

Blame for the incident has been placed on China Central Television, whose employees apparently defied regulations and staged their pyrotechnics display too close to the unfinished building. One firefighter died and six others were injured fighting the blaze.

The Chinese government has moved fast to staunch any reporting of the incident. By morning the next day there were no pictures on the front page of China’s major newspapers. Besides a brief report of a “fire” from Xinhua and CCTV, reports on the incident were eerily non-existent. The evening news that night did not mention the story.

Soon after the fire, the chat forums were abuzz with citizen reports of the “CCTV building on fire”. Pictures and videos flooded cyberspace but no news of the incident was reported on any of China’s major news channels. Later on that evening a leaked declaration from Chinese authorities made it on the internet:

Translation: “No photos, no video clips, no in-depth reports… All media outlets must only use Xinhua dispatches. The news should be put on news areas only and the comments posting areas should be closed.”

For more on Chinese netizen reaction to the fire and subsequent media censorship, check out ChinaSmack’s post here and here.

February 10th, 2009 | Category: Internet Freedom, Natural Disasters | Leave a comment